The introduction of nanotechnology into our civil life and warfare is expected to influence the application and interpretation of the existing rules of international humanitarian law. This article examines the challenges posed to international humanitarian law by the widespread use of nanotechnology in light of four basic rules of international humanitarian law: (1) the obligation to ensure the legality of weapons; (2) distinction; (3) proportionality; and (4) precaution. It concludes by identifying three areas of concern, which arise from widespread use of nanotechnology, for the application of international humanitarian law.
The interaction between technological development and armed forces is a constant feature of the history of warfare. Technological development can be stimulated by, and dedicated directly to addressing, military requirements. On other occasions, technological development outside the military sphere affects or informs the conduct of warfare and military expectations, as has been illustrated by the application of computing and software innovations that have led to major changes in the military tactics of developed nations. 1 Nanotechnology is widely considered a next-generation transformational technology with profound implications for all aspects of modern society. 2 The introduction of nanotechnology into our civil life and warfare is also expected to influence the application and interpretation of the existing rules of international humanitarian law, raising 'the question of whether the rules are sufficiently clear in light of the technology's specific characteristics, as well as with regard to the foreseeable humanitarian impact it may have '. 3 This article examines the challenges posed to international humanitarian law by the widespread use of nanotechnology-enabled materials and other potential applications of nanotechnology in light of what is feasible at the present stage of scientific research. 4 This assessment can only be preliminary because the full potential of nanotechnology is yet to be revealed. To that end, the article first introduces various applications of nanotechnology relevant to the conduct of modern warfare with a particular focus on armed attacks by conventional weapons. 5 It then examines the impact and influence of nanotechnology for the application of four basic rules of international humanitarian law. It concludes by identifying three areas of concern arising from widespread use of nanotechnology for the application of international humanitarian law. nickel nanoparticles. 14 Those ENMs and ENPs, when inhaled, typically elicit pulmonary inflammation and cardiovascular problems. 15 Scientific studies have also suggested carcinogenicity, cytotoxicity, and genotoxicity of certain nanomaterials and nanoparticles. 16 These health and environmental hazards are not localized because of the potential long-range transport of nanoparticles through the air and water after their release into the environment. 17 The relevance of nanotechnology to the military resides particularly in its application to enhance military capabilities including:
. soldier survivability (for example, lighter, stronger, and heat-resistant armour and clothing); 18 . force protection (for example, enhanced camouflaging, 19 ENPs may enter into human bodies through inhalation, and also into the environment with the real possibility that nanomaterials may move through food chains and culminate in human exposure. 32 Very little information is currently available on the potential longevity of ENMs and ENPs in the environment, bioaccumulation, and the possibility of detection and removal -particularly in relation to weathered nanoparticles that have undergone agglomeration and transformation. 33 Particularly when ENMs and ENPs are dispersed into the air and water, the risk of long-term, widespread, severe health and environmental damages cannot be easily dismissed. Health and environmental concerns associated with the use of a particular type of weapon are not unique to nanotechnologies in modern warfare. Concern has been raised, for example, with regard to indirect impacts of metal dust in whatever form it might be released. Illustrative is the Gulf War Syndrome, which is thought to be caused by exposure to toxic chemicals released upon impact by depleted uranium weapons. 34 Scientific evidence also suggests the possibility that the energy-charged, heavy metal tungsten alloy (HMTA) powder released by dense inert metal explosives (DIME) is tumour-generating and capable of genotoxic effects. 35 One significant difference between such toxic chemicals and ENMs or ENPs, however, is that it is not just the military use in weaponry, but more importantly, the widespread civilian use that is likely to cause a large-scale release of toxic substances and hence significantly increase the risk of exposure.
Acknowledging a wide range of beneficial applications of nanotechnology, particularly in addressing national priority issues such as energy security and water H. Nasu -Nanotechnology and challenges to international humanitarian law: a preliminary legal assessment security, as well as strong interests in the development of nanotechnologies for businesses and industries, it is highly unlikely that national regulatory authorities will move to ban the use of ENMs and ENPs. 36 Nevertheless, some states have recently started regulating the use of ENMs and ENPs in consumer products based on their 'use scenario'. 37 Yet, national regulation will not effectively prevent toxic ENMs and ENPs, released as a result of armed attacks, from posing widespread health and environmental hazards unless the regulation is specifically designed for such an event. 38
Nanotechnology and the principles of international humanitarian law
Currently there is no international treaty that specifically regulates the use of nanotechnology for military purposes or otherwise. A preventive arms control treaty to regulate or ban the use of nanotechnology for military purposes is unlikely to materialize 39 because international arms control treaties tend to be reactive to technological developments and are limited in scope, prohibiting or regulating only specific weapons defined by their design, intent, and characteristics. 40 However, the use of nanotechnology is already restricted to the extent that it is used to develop or enhance weapons that are prohibited by existing arms control treaties, such as biological weapons, 41 46 and, most recently, cluster munitions. 47 Nanotechnology, if used as an enabling technology for weapons development in these areas, would be regulated by the relevant treaty. Nanotechnology, for example, can produce lasers far more powerful than those previously known. 48 The ability of nanotechnology to design and manipulate molecules with specific properties could lead to bio/chemical agents capable of causing defined hostile results ranging from temporary incapacitation to death, or multilayered biochemical carriers that could easily control the spread of bio/chemical agents. 49 General principles of international humanitarian law, conversely, tend to refer to the effects produced by the use of means or methods of warfare. 50 The general principle that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of warfare is not unlimited' has been codified in international humanitarian law instruments. 51 This general principle and other rules of international humanitarian law must be read in light of the Martens Clause. 52 Although 'principles of humanity' and 'dictates of public conscience' alone may provide no firm legal basis to prohibit the use 54 In light of this, the following sections discuss the legal challenges posed by the development of nanotechnology with respect to four basic rules of international humanitarian law: (1) the obligation to ensure the legality of weapons; (2) distinction; (3) proportionality; and (4) precaution.
The legality of weapons 55
When assessing the legality of weapons at each stage of their development and acquisition, states are required, under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, to take into consideration the health-related impact of the use of the weapon. Such assessment, equally valid for nanotechnology, must be based on all the relevant scientific evidence. 56 The principle prohibiting the employment of arms, projectiles, or material 'of a nature to cause superfluous injury' (or 'calculated to cause unnecessary suffering'), 57 as well as the principle prohibiting the 'methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment', 58 is central to the consideration of legality of nanotechnology-enabled or enhanced weapons under international humanitarian law. 59 For the purpose of this weapons review, superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is examined only in light of the broad and general circumstances in which the weapon is intended for use, as opposed to a particular use of a weapon which is assessed against the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in the operational context of a particular attack. 60 53 See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, 'Historical development and legal basis', in Dieter Fleck (ed. The principle prohibiting superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering was first enunciated in the preamble to the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, 61 but this general principle was a rhetorical expression of the drafters' inspiration, rather than of their intention to impose legal obligations. 62 It was formally adopted as a binding rule in the subsequent treaties, 63 and since then has attained the status of customary international law. 64 This principle applies universally, irrespective of the distinction between civilian and military targets. 65 The prohibition is now incorporated into the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as a war crime. 66 This principle is of central relevance to the use of nanotechnology in the development of weapons, insofar as those weapons could cause unnecessary suffering.
Yet, exactly which use of nanotechnology in weaponry is deemed illegal depends on the interpretation of what constitutes 'superfluous injury' and 'unnecessary suffering'. One may take a subjective approach by looking at the primary purpose for which the new weapon is designed in order to determine whether it causes injury or suffering disproportionate to its military effectiveness. 67 This dominant view suggests that one must balance the degree of injury or suffering inflicted on the one hand, and the degree of military necessity underlying the choice of particular weapon on the other. 68 The other, more objective approach to 'superfluous injury' or 'unnecessary suffering' under international humanitarian law places greater emphasis on excessive harm inflicted on the victim in relation to the damage necessary to place a combatant hors de combat for the duration of combat. 69 61 It reads that 'the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable . . . would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity'. 62 F. Kalshoven Depending on which approach is taken, the legality of a military application of nanotechnology may well be considered differently. This is particularly so when the application of nanotechnology is designed to enhance penetration capabilities of a weapon, such as thermobaric explosives, to destroy targets inside hardened and deeply buried structures or buildings, yet potentially involving hazardous health and environmental impacts. For example, the deployment of nano-energetic thermobaric explosives could well be justified on the grounds that targeting terrorists or insurgents inside hardened compounds outweighs considerations of severe suffering from the primary blast or thermal damage for combatants or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities.
There is a subtle difference under this international humanitarian law principle between 'injury' and 'suffering'. The former indicates immediate, physical damage, whereas the latter may entail the incidence of permanent damage or disfigurement. 70 This distinction, and emphasis on permanent damage or disfigurement, is of increased significance given that, as is the case with ENMs and ENPs, technological advancement is making it more difficult to scientifically appreciate the full range of damaging effects of a new weapon on the human body by looking only at the weapon's construction. 71 In fact, the idea to extend the meaning of suffering even to harmful effects that ensue after the end of hostilities reportedly influenced the treaty negotiations about blinding laser weapons, particularly the long-term impact of blind veterans on society. 72 An expanded reading of suffering in the application of this principle is one way of casting light on social costs associated with the health and environmental hazards produced by the release of toxic ENMs and ENPs during warfare, which are imposed upon peacebuilding efforts in the aftermath of warfare. 73 Yet, scientific uncertainty surrounding the health and environmental effects of ENMs and ENPs, particularly in relation to the causal link between the weapon and the hazards, makes it a formidable task to prove the suffering. 74 This is due to the difficulties of adequately accounting for combined toxic effects of, and interactions between, different substances.
Insofar as the toxic effects of ENMs and ENPs could extend to the natural environment, including micro-organisms in the soil and water and follow-on effects concerns fail to reach this threshold, then they would have to be considered in light of whether the prohibition on superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering extends to accommodate those concerns as 'suffering'.
Distinction
The cardinal point in the principle of distinction is that combatants are clearly distinguishable from civilians, who are not to be directly targeted. 81 This principle is enunciated in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, which reads: '[t]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants . . . and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.' 82 This principle imposes two inextricably connected obligations: it requires states to direct their military attacks only against combatants, on the one hand; and, in order to enable states to comply with the first obligation, it requires them to distinguish combatants from civilians by means of, inter alia, 'a characteristic piece of clothing which is visible'. 83 Stealth technology has already been introduced for military aircraft to reduce the visibility and the probability of detection by radar, infrared, or other probe beams. 84 However, nanofabrication technology has the potential to enhance this stealth technology further by enabling optical camouflage (also often called adaptive camouflage). 85 Using optical camouflage in all of three light spectrumsvisible light, night-vision spectrum, and thermal/infrared spectrum -to cloak soldiers and their equipment will enable complete invisibility, undetectable by any traditional means of warfare until a new detection technology is developed. 86 Camouflaging is a typical example of traditional military tactics of deception permitted as ruses of warfare. 87 It is not prohibited insofar as no rule of international humanitarian law is infringed and it cannot be considered a perfidious act insofar as it does not invite the confidence of the enemy with respect to protection under international humanitarian law. 88 Yet, in situations where cloaked combatants launch attacks from within a civilian-populated area, the only way the adverse party can counter-attack is to fire in the direction the attacks came from without being able to identify or distinguish combatants from civilians. The adverse party is thus prevented from complying with the principle of distinction. Similar difficulties have arisen in situations where combatants are firing from civilian buildings; however, enhanced optical camouflaging effectively deprives the adverse party of any chance to detect lawful military targets. This may well raise a significant issue challenging the application of the principle of distinction. Thus cloaking devices must be used with necessary precautions against endangering civilians. 89 The application of nanotechnology to facilities for complete or partial military use, on the other hand, does not challenge the application of the principle of distinction. Attacks must be directed against legitimate military objectives, which are defined by Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, as objects 'which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage'. Therefore, any facility, installation, or building, no matter how or whether ENMs and ENPs are used, is not immune from becoming a legitimate military target.
Special protection is accorded to dams, dykes, and nuclear electricitygenerating stations under Article 56 of Additional Protocol I because of concern about the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe damage to the civilian population as a result of an attack against those works and installations. 90 Yet, alternative electricity-generating stations, such as nanotechnology-enhanced solar power plants, 91 do not fall under this category of specially protected objects. Even if targeting nanotechnology-enhanced solar power plants may result in the release of toxic ENMs and ENPs into the environment and human bodies, the environmental and health risks do not make those plants immune from direct military attacks. Rather, as will be discussed below, those effects are more likely to be relevant to the principles of proportionality and precaution.
Thus, no electricity-generating station, whether nanotechnology enhanced or not, is currently protected from direct attacks under international humanitarian law. It is arguable that, in the future, attacks against nanotechnology-enhanced power plants could result in the release of dangerous forces, prompting a call to amend Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to expand the scope of its legal protection. Alternatively, society may move to more decentralized electricity generation relying on solar panels in each household. In that case, the mere possibility that electric power generated from each household is used for military purposes would not necessarily make civilian houses legitimate military objectives. 92 
Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is widely recognized as a rule of customary international law regulating the conduct of warfare both in international and noninternational armed conflicts. 93 Although the term 'proportionality' does not appear in the text of Additional Protocol I, 94 the gist of the principle is reflected in Article 51(5)(b) as an example of indiscriminate attack and also in Article 57(2)(a)(iii) as one of the precautions to be taken, prohibiting 'an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated'. The inherent subjectivity in assessing excessiveness while balancing two different values -anticipated military advantage and expected incidental losses -has been a subject of controversy and even criticism of the practicality of this principle. 95 Relevant to the implications of nanotechnology is the question as to what extent the 'effect' of attacks must be taken into account in the proportionality calculus, given that the potential health and environmental effects of ENMs and ENPs are the primary concerns about the use of nanotechnology among regulators around the world. 96 The larger the radius of incidental civilian losses is drawn, the more difficult it may become to justify the damage on proportionality grounds. Indirect costs and long-term effects (sometimes called reverberating effects) of a military attack tend to be ignored in the proportionality calculus, as the indirect effects are less visible than direct damage and more difficult to ascertain. 97 However, to the extent that the principle of proportionality is based on the idea of humanity and is influenced by the development of human rights norms, 98 a greater awareness of the indirect and long-term impacts of military attacks may well challenge the validity of traditional practice. Thus, Henry Shu and David Wippman, for example, consider that the loss of a civilian function as a result of destroying a dual-use facility (such as electricity-generating plant) should not be discounted from the proportionality calculus merely because the object is a military objective. 99 More relevantly, considering the implications of recent technological improvements, Michael Schmitt suggests that humanitarian attention may well centre on reverberating effects or derivative consequences, 'now that the means exist to limit dramatically direct collateral damage and incidental injury that we are being sensitized to reverberation'. 100 Environmental concerns are already acknowledged in a general principle of proportionality. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed in its advisory opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that '[s]tates must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives'. 101 Yet, the extent to which states are required to take environmental considerations into account is far from clear. If the principle of proportionality is read in conjunction with Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I, relevant considerations are narrowly confined to 'widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment'. Unlike the prohibition under Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I, environmental considerations referred to in Article 55(1) impose only a duty of care and are focused on the health and survival of the population. 102 This suggests that even if nanotechnology is not involved in the methods or means of warfare employed, commanders are under a duty of care not to cause widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage that threatens the health or survival of the population when targeting nanotechnology-enabled or enhanced facilities, whether they are legitimate military objectives or not.
Here, the consideration of environmental effects in the context of Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I is subject to two qualifications. First, commanders are required to take into account widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage that may be expected to jeopardize the survival of the population or seriously prejudice health by causing, for example, congenital defects, degenerations, or deformities. 103 Therefore, one needs to speculate: (i) whether the attack is likely to involve destruction of nanotechnology-enabled or enhanced facilities; (ii) whether ENMs and ENPs released upon impact might cause widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage; and (iii) how human bodies and genes are affected by contact with those substances. Yet, the process of transformation, agglomeration, and fusion with larger substances cause tremendous scientific difficulties for the precise understanding of the nature and extent of health effects. 104 In future conflicts, commanders will have to face 'the fog of science' in battlefields and exercise the duty of care based on the uncertain probability of risk.
Second, the duty of care leaves some latitude for judgement. 105 It is in this context that the principle of proportionality arguably finds its application in relation to environmental collateral damage. 106 This idea is given a clear expression in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 1998 Rome Statute, which provides in its definition of war crimes:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
Thus, as an element of war crime, environmental damage, to a limited extent, has been incorporated into the proportionality assessment. 107 Yet again, the scientific uncertainty with regard to the full extent and nature of the environmental and health damage caused by the release of and contact with toxic ENMs and ENPs raises challenging questions as to whether the mere availability of scientific evidence is sufficient to constitute 'knowledge' and how the potentially hazardous environmental and health effects are considered 'excessive'. The same questions apply to the proportionality requirement under international humanitarian law, even though the element of knowledge is more loosely expressed. 108 Due to these two qualifications, therefore, the application of Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I is of little practical use when regulating the conduct of warfare to restrict or prevent widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage that may be caused by the dispersion of toxic ENMs and ENPs as a result of military attacks. Conversely, Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I does not require the expected environmental damage to be widespread, long-term, or severe, and therefore arguably allows for a greater scope of incidental loss to accommodate the consideration of potential environmental and health effects of dispersed ENMs and ENPs, though this scope depends on how widely the incidental loss can be interpreted.
Precaution
Two different obligations of precaution are stipulated in Articles 57 and 58 of Additional Protocol I: precaution in attack and precaution in defence, respectively. 109 It is widely accepted that the obligation to take precautions in planning or deciding upon an attack is a rule of customary international law. 110 To the extent that the wording of Article 57 incorporates the principle of proportionality, the same legal issue will arise as discussed above in relation to the degree to which health and environmental harm caused by the release of toxic ENMs and ENPs upon impact in an armed attack are considered civilian losses. The obligation of precaution raises an additional issue as to what extent indirect or reverberating effects should be foreseeable -in other words, what level or amount of knowledge is required as the basis for taking precautions.
Interestingly, the ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian Law Study understands that the principle of precaution is to be observed even if there is scientific uncertainty as to the effects on the environment of certain military operations. 111 It is debatable to what extent that reading of the 'precautionary principle', which has developed in the field of international environmental law, has been accepted as an interpretation of the obligation to take precautions under international humanitarian law. 112 However, an application of the precautionary principle in the modern world of nanotechnology would pose significant challenges to military operations, insofar as it would require taking all feasible precautions to minimize the release of toxic ENMs and ENPs as a result of armed attacks, even in the absence of scientific certainty as to the actual toxic effects. It may well be unrealistic to expect that a decision be made to halt an attack on the grounds that the potential health and environmental damage is considered excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
This issue also needs to be addressed in the context of precaution in defence. Article 58 of Additional Protocol I requires state parties to take feasible precautions to, among others things, 'protect civilians and civilian objects against the dangers resulting from military operations' (emphasis added). While this obligation is arguably considered a rule of customary international law, 113 the reality is that national regulatory authorities in modern society rarely pay heed to the possibility of future warfare and its effects for civilian life. 114 The seriousness of this oversight was illustrated by the increased number of cancer-related deaths in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York due to the exposure to toxic dust released from the collapsed buildings. 115 With the impending threat of health and environmental hazards potentially resulting from the release of toxic ENMs and ENPs during warfare, a greater recognition of the obligation to take precautions to protect civilians from the effects of armed attacks arguably has the potential to encourage and facilitate more comprehensive nanotechnology regulation encompassing the prevention and control of exposure to toxic ENMs and ENPs.
Conclusion
Nanotechnology may well be seen as of little concern for the implementation of international humanitarian law in modern warfare, particularly if direct civilian casualties are reduced by the introduction of more sophisticated, precise, and efficient weapons and delivery systems enabled or enhanced by nanotechnology. One need only recall the traditionally held view that the legitimate objective in warfare is to weaken enemy forces by disabling the greatest possible number of combatants. 116 However, the focus of modern warfare has been shifting more towards precision-focused, effects-based military operations, which places an emphasis on achieving certain results rather than the absolute destruction of enemy forces. 117 This shift of military doctrine arguably underlines a greater need to reconsider how and to what extent the potential hazardous effects of ENMs and ENPs on health and the environment should or should not be taken into account when applying basic rules of international humanitarian law.
By examining this question, this article has identified three areas of concern for the application of international humanitarian law that arise from widespread use of nanotechnology. First, scientific uncertainty surrounding the health and environmental impacts of ENMs and ENPs raises an issue concerning the level or amount of knowledge required when considering the legality of a weapon, assessing the excessiveness of an attack, and taking precautions during targeting decision-making. Second, there is no clear guidance as to how widely health and environmental effects resulting from armed attacks must be taken into account, except when the effects are intended, or may be expected, to be widespread, longterm, and severe. This is because of the unsettled debate over the extent to which indirect, long-term impacts should be taken into account when considering what constitutes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and also when assessing the excessiveness of an attack. Third, the principle of distinction and the obligation to take precautions will become more difficult to sustain unless the significance of more comprehensive nanotechnology regulation envisaging wartime situations is recognized by national regulatory authorities.
